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THE WORLD BANK'S INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OF INDIA'S SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECTS
Thomas R. Berger
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the World Bank established for the first time an Independent
Review, a panel to evaluate one of its projects.' The Independent Re-
view was organized to examine the Sardar Sarovar Projects (Sardar
Sarovar) in India.2 Bradford Morse, former head of the United Nations
Development Program, was appointed Chairman of the Independent
Review in June 1991. The Terms of Reference by which the Indepen-
dent Review- would evaluate the project were set forth in March 1991V
* Thomas R. Berger was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Independent Re-
view of the Sardar Sarovar Projects in September 1991 by the World Bank. Mr.
Berger headed the British Columbia Commission on Family and Children's Law,
1973-1974; the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, 1974-1977; the Alaska Native
Review Commission, 1983-1985; and served on the Supreme Court of British Colum-
bia, 1971-1983. Mr. Berger would like to express the Independent Review's appre-
ciation for the contribution of Donald J. Gamble, Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor,
Environment, for the Independent Review, and Hugh Brody, Senior Advisor, Reset-
tlement and Rehabilitation Assessment for the Review.
1. This Essay is primarily based upon material contained in SARDAR SAROVAR,
THE REPORT OF Ta INDEENDENT REvIEW (1992) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT REvEw].
See id. at xi-xxv (reproducing letter to World Bank President Lewis T. Preston docu-
menting World Bank participation in the Sardar Sarovar Projects and the genesis of
the Independent Review). See generally Molly Moore, India's Lifeline or Man-Made
Disaster?, WASH. PosT, Aug. 24, 1993, at A12 (giving a general history of the dam
and canal project, and discussing some of the projects' problems); Left, Right, Center
Rage over Narmada Project, FIN. TIMIEs, Aug. 16, 1993 (reporting on the tension
between anti-dam activists and local state officials); India Says It Will Review
Narmada Dam Project, GAZEIrE (Montreal), June 26, 1993, at 16.
2. See INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 9-10 (stating that the Independent
Review developed out of controversy over whether India and the governments of
Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh have complied with resettlement, rehabilita-
tion, and environmental impact mitigation policies implicated in the Sardar Sarovar
Projects).
3. See INDEPENDENT REVEEw, supra note 1, at 359-60 (setting forth the Terms
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The Government of India asserts that Sardar Sarovar is the largest
water project ever undertaken. The venture includes the construction of a
high dam on the Narmada River, the creation of a reservoir submerging
land in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, arid Madhya Pradesh, and an
extensive canal and irrigation system in Gujarat.
Since gaining independence in 1950, India has been the world's most
prolific dam builder. Many of the dams constructed have been financed
in part by the World Bank. In recent years, controversy has surfaced
over the construction of some of these projects. Perhaps the most con-
troversial of these is the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada River.
After extensive planning, construction of the dam and canal system
began in 1987. Soon afterwards, the Sardar Sarovar became the focus of
debate over the importance of industrial progress, as opposed to the
need to respect human rights and protect the environment. In light of
these considerations, the mandate of the Independent Review was essen-
tially twofold. First, the Independent Review was charged with the re-
sponsibility of assessing the measures taken to resettle and rehabilitate
those persons who would be affected by the construction of the dam,
reservoir, and canal system. Second, the Independent Review was estab-
lished to evaluate the measures designed to ameliorate the impact of
Sardar Sarovar on the environment.
While conscious of Indian sovereignty, the Independent Review insist-
ed upon candid and unhindered communication - including the ability
to receive written submissions openly that pertained to the projects. The
Independent Review also asserted its right to travel freely and maintain
complete editorial control over its final report. To secure this end, the
Independent Review insisted upon a separate budget with sufficient
funds both to allow the Independent Review to publish the final report
publicly, and to assure its circulation in India and among those individu-
als who made submissions.
of Reference for evaluation of the dam and canal project by the Independent Review).
[VOL. 9:1
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
I. HISTORY OF THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECTS
In both developed and developing countries, dam construction and
other large-scale projects have inundated millions of hectares of land,
raising serious questions about human and environmental repercussions
of the intentional flooding. Often the areas affected are tribal lands and
territory belonging to rural peasants. The development of the Sardar
Sarovar, for example, has sharpened the focus of worldwide concern, in
part because of the scale of the venture. Another aspect drawing atten-
tion to Sardar Sarovar is the resistance of the people on the periphery of
development, whose ancestral lands are being expropriated for what
some believe to be for the benefit of the majority. Indeed, the increasing
willingness of these people to speak on their own behalf has placed
Sardar Sarovar squarely in the public eye.
The Sardar Sarovar dam is situated about 180 kilometers from the
Arabian Sea in northwestern India. Upon completion, the dam will im-
pound water to a full reservoir level of 455 feet and submerge approxi-
mately 37,000 hectares of land in the three states of Gujarat,
Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. The dam, along with planned con-
struction developments farther upstream, is designed to divert 9.5 million
acre feet of water from the Narmada River into a canal and irrigation
system, delivering drinking water to drought-prone areas of Gujarat. The
canal itself, the biggest in the world in terms of its capacity, will extend
450 kilometers to the border between Gujarat and Rajasthan. The main
canal is 250 meters wide at its head and 100 meters wide at the
Rajasthan border. The aggregate length of the distribution network is
75,000 kilometers. Overall, the canal will require approximately 80,000
hectares of land, more than twice as much land as the area to be sub-
merged.
The impact of the Sardar Sarovar extends over an immense area and
affects a large number of individuals, particularly tribal people. At least
100,000 people living in 245 villages are within the area designated for
submergence. In Gujarat and Maharashtra, almost all of the people are
tribal members. Similarly, thousands of tribal people and numerous
Hindu caste villages populate the area of Madhya Pradesh to be sub-
merged. The inhabitants of the Hindu villages engage in conventional
agriculture that will be affected by submergence. Approximately 140,000
families are likely to be disrupted by the construction of the canal and
irrigation system, while thousands of individuals living below the dam
will be significantly affected.
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The Sardar Sarovar has therefore come under scrutiny at a time of
global awakening to the consequences of large-scale projects in rural
and remote areas, especially those areas inhabited by indigenous or tribal
people. Consequently, Sardar Sarovar has become a symbol in India and
other countries. Some view the dam and canal project as representing
economic development that will bring enormous benefits to millions;
others regard it as an imposition that will culturally and economically
impoverish hundreds of thousands of people while irrevocably altering,
if not destroying, the natural environment that the Narmada River sup-
ports.
Proponents of Sardar Sarovar, who refer to the venture as the "lifeline
of Gujarat," emphasize that the project will bring drinking water to over
40 million people, irrigation to 1.8 million hectares of land, and hydro-
electric power. The proponents suggest that these tangible benefits
should be weighed against the large number of people who may be
adversely affected. In doing so, they note that the majority of displace-
ment will harm tribal people whose lands consist of steep, rocky ground,
and degraded forests. The land that will be lost, they say, is of marginal
value. Thus, proponents of Sardar Sarovar find sufficient justification for
the enterprise by balancing the number of people who will benefit from
its completion against those individuals who will be uprooted.
Opponents of the Sardar Sarovar argue that the plan's proposed bene-
fits will never materialize. They contend that adequate drinking water
will never reach drought-prone areas, while the irrigation benefits that
the Sardar Sarovar is supposed to produce have been vastly overestimat-
ed. Opponents also argue that adequate measures are not being taken to
resettle families displaced by the dam and canal project, and that reha-
bilitation of the families as planned cannot succeed. Finally, they sug-
gest that the environmental impact of the Sardar Sarovar will be far
greater than predicted.
As a point of reference, in 1985 the World Bank entered into credit
and loan agreements with India and the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra,
and Madhya Pradesh to help finance the construction of the Sardar
Sarovar dam and canal.' Under the agreements, the World Bank has
accorded only those persons whose villages will be affected by submer-
gence as "project-affected" individuals entitled to resettlement and reha-
bilitation.
4. See INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at xxi (noting that the World Bank
extended credit and loan funding for Sardar Sarovar in 1985 without assessing the
environmental implications of the project).
[VOL. 9:1
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
The first task of the Independent Review was to consider the mea-
sures being taken for the resettlement and rehabilitation of "project-
affected" people. In doing so, the Independent Review also considered
"canal-affected persons." The Terms of Reference of the Independent
Review recognized such persons "displaced/affected by the reservoir and
infrastructure." The President of the World Bank, Mr. Barber Conable,
asked the Independent Review to consider, under the Terms of Refer-
ence, the status of resettlement and compensation for "canal-affected
persons." On the environmental side, the Terms of Reference required
consideration of the measures being taken to ameliorate the impact of
"all aspects of the Projects."
The World Bank's decision to establish the Independent Review is
unprecedented. The World Bank provided the Independent Review with
all necessary documents, engaged in candid discussions, and provided
the latitude required to complete the panel's investigation. An interna-
tional aid organization has never before established an investigatory
body with a mandate as sweeping as that of the Independent Review, no
matter how controversial. Further, the Independent Review also enjoyed
the cooperation of the governments of India, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Madhya Pradesh; of non-governmental organizations; and of people
affected by the Sardar Sarovar Projects.
II. MODUS OPERANDI OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
The Independent Review emphasized the autonomous nature of the
investigation throughout the visit to India. Though the Terms of Refer-
ence were determined by the President of the World Bank, none of the
Independent Review members worked or had worked for that institution
in the past or at present. The Independent Review was determined to
travel wherever necessary and to communicate with whomever the
investigators deemed appropriate. This independence was integral to the
entire modus operandi. While the World Bank provided financial sup-
port, the Independent Review designed and administered its own budget
and retained complete editorial control over the final report.
In the course of the investigation, the Independent Review travelled
throughout the Narmada Valley, including the dam site, the submergence
and catchment areas, territory downstream and around the command
area, and the route of the canal. Visits were made to Kutchch and
Saurashtra, where recurring drought conditions have caused great person-
al hardship.
The Independent Review met frequently with officials from the gov-
ernment of India, including the Minister of Water Resources, his deputy,
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and other Union Government Ministries officials. Meetings were also
arranged with the governments of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya
Pradesh, as well as the Narmada Control Authority, the Narmada Valley
Development Authority, and the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limit-
ed. All of the officials of the union government, state government, and
relevant agencies cooperated fully and provided whatever documents
were requested. The staff of the World Bank, located both in Washing-
ton, D.C. and India, furnished access to Bank files. The chief minister
of Gujarat, members of the Gujarat legislature, members of parliament
from Gujarat, and the Gujarat business community emphasized the bene-
fits the Sardar Sarovar is expected to bring to that state. Similarly, the
chief minister of Madhya Pradesh and the chief minister of Maharashtra,
as well as other officials from these states, also stressed the benefits that
the dam and canal would bring. The Independent Review toured loca-
tions and talked with the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Arch
Vahini and Anand Niketan Ashram, both of which have worked tireless-
ly to help with resettlement of displaced persons.
Many critics challenged the fundamental assumptions upon which the
Sardar Sarovar is based. Others proposed stopping the construction of
the dam altogether. Opponents not only argued against what they regard
as flaws in the plan but also questioned the advisability of proceeding at
all. This view was frequently expressed by Narmada Bachao Andolan,
an Indian NGO which represents many people of the Narmada Valley.
The Independent Review met with eminent persons on both sides of the
issue in New Delhi, Bombay, Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Bhopal,
and Indore.
Ultimately, the Independent Review visited sixty-five tribal and peas-
ant villages throughout the Narmada Valley and command area, allowing
the Independent Review to listen to local inhabitants as well as people
from surrounding locales. During the tour, an additional sixty villages
were contacted. Twenty of the villages visited were relocation sites. At
these sites, and at meetings with people affected by the project or
"oustees" at Kevadia, the Independent Review listened to people from
another thirty relocation sites.
Government officials often accompanied the Independent Review and
provided translators. In many places, however, NGOs have easier access
than governments or World Bank representatives. Thus, the Independent
Review traveled with NGOs to many villages where World Bank mis-
sions had previously been unable to travel. In turn, representatives of
Arch Vahini, Narmada Bachao Andolan, and Anand Niketan Ashram,
often accompanied the Independent Review. In India there is a strong
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tradition of participation of NGOs in public life, and the final report
frequently refers to the work of the NGOs. In Gujarat, the birthplace of
Mahatma Gandhi, this tradition is especially pronounced.
The contributions made by Arch Vahini, Narmada Bachao Andolan,
and Anand Niketan Ashram draw on the Indian tradition of community
and spiritual leadership. The Independent Review found that, in the
finest traditions of India and Indian democracy, there was uninhibited
discussion of the Sardar Sarovar in the press and elsewhere, which gen-
erated considerable intellectual ferment. The Independent Review spent
time with academics, retired public servants, and others who were eager
to provide information and argument on both sides of the issue. Indeed,
the Independent Review challenged interested people to make formal,
written submissions to which more careful consideration could be paid.
The panel commissioned several studies and obtained expert advice on a
number of issues. Ultimately, the influence that this open and free dis-
cussion of the Sardar Sarovar had on the investigation was immense.
The knowledge of the Independent Review, therefore, was derived
from several sources including information obtained during meetings in
India, research data and material from government and World Bank
files, submissions written specifically for the Independent Review's
examination, and the on-site evaluation of tribal and peasant villages in
the Narmada Valley and in the relocation sites in Gujarat and
Maharashtra. As of the time of the investigation, no relocation sites
existed in Madhya Pradesh to which anyone had been resettled.
The draft report of the Independent Review was submitted to the
World Bank on April 1, 1992. In response, the World Bank prepared an
extensive and useful critique of the analysis and findings. The Indepen-
dent Review then met for two days in Washington, D.C. with Mr. Jo-
seph Wood, the World Bank's Vice-President for Asia, and with a num-
ber of other World Bank staff and technical people. The discussions
were frank and the Independent Review was prepared to modify the
report wherever the World Bank noted a mistake in fact or analysis.
Given that the Independent Review was well acquainted with World
Bank files and with their point of view, however, few changes were
actually required in what became known as the Independent Review's
final report.
II. THE NORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RESETLEMENT AND
REHABILITATION
Since World War II, industrial and developing countries have built
high dams in rural, forest, and frontier regions. Usually this development
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has resulted in incursions on the lands of indigenous and tribal people.
The special situation of these groups first gave rise to measures to pro-
tect persons subject to involuntary resettlement. The earliest international
recognition of involuntary resettlement occurred in 1957. In that year the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) passed Convention 107, which
required that indigenous or tribal oustee families be "provided with
lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied
by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future devel-
opment."5 India subsequently ratified the convention on September 29,
1958,6 (neither Canada nor the United States has ratified it yet).
In 1980, the World Bank adopted for the first time a general resettle-
ment policy.7 Indeed, the World Bank made clear in the policy that
there must not only be resettlement but also rehabilitation. Therefore, the
policy provided that, upon resettlement, displaced persons should "regain
at least their previous standard of living."' Such persons were to include
those displaced by dams and canals. Moreover, in 1982, the World Bank
developed a policy specifically designed for tribal people.9 The policy
provided that the customary usage of tribal land should be respected,
and required that the tribal people should only be displaced when the
borrowing country can safeguard the integrity and well-being of the
tribal people effectively through regulations or other measures.
As required by the Terms of Reference, the Independent Review
investigated World Bank policy after 1985, the year of the credit and
loan agreements. In 1990 and 1991, the World Bank issued two opera-
tional directives on involuntary resettlement: Directive 4.30 on involun-
tary resettlement generally" and Directive 4.20 on resettlement of in-
digenous peoples in particular." The two directives represent the culmi-
5. See INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting the Convention Con-
cerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries of 1957).
6. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 18.
7. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENT No. 2.333: SOCIAL ISSUES
ASSOCIATED wrH INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT IN BANK-FINANCED PROJECTS (1980),
reprinted in INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 23.
8. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 23.
9. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENT No. 2.34: TRIBAL PEOPLE
IN BANK-FINANCED PROJECTS (1992), reprinted in INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note
1, at 26.
10. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECrIVE 4.30: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT
(1990), reprinted in INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 32-35.
11. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DmECTrIVE 4.20: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1991),
reprinted in INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 35-37.
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nation of a decade of policy development. Moreover, the World Bank in
the directives set the highest standards of any aid or lending organiza-
tion in the world for mitigating adverse consequences to human well-
being caused by involuntary resettlement. At the same time, the Inde-
pendent Review was being formed and had to bear in mind that these
standards were adopted by the World Bank in 1990 and 1991, over five
years after the credit and loan agreements had been signed.
These policy changes at the World Bank reflect the world-wide devel-
opment of human rights concepts. These changes constitute a recognition
that large-scale projects, especially in rural, wilderness and frontier areas,
may displace people just as war and natural calamities do. The policy
changes focus on people who are being displaced by the advance of
development, and require that in any project the human rights of the
oustees must be respected. According to the ILO, these rights should not
be impaired on grounds of national sovereignty or national economic
interest. While such considerations may justify a project; they do not
justify the nullification of these basic human rights.
There are more than 60 million tribal people in India, many of whom
are dependent on land they and their ancestors have cultivated for gener-
ations. In 1987 the United Nations World Commission on Environment
and Development (the Brundtland Commission) addressed the need for
respect for indigenous and tribal land and resource rights. The
Brundtland Commission said that "[tihe starting point for a just and
humane policy for such groups is the recognition and protection of their
traditional rights to land and other resources that sustain their way of
life - rights they may define in terms that do not fit into standard
legal systems."' 2
Tribal people will make up the majority of the people ousted by the
construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam. Most of these tribal people live
in the forests, raise crops and graze cattle. Usually they have no formal
title to the land, even though they may have lived there for generations,
they are called "encroachers." The state governments of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh took the position that the encroachers were not entitled
to be resettled as farmers. According to Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh state policy on resettlement, "encroachers" would be treated as
landless labourers. This designation meant that they would be uprooted
from their lands and resettled without sufficient land to continue farm-
ing. Although Gujarat adopted a policy of full benefits for tribal people,
only a small proportion of the displaced persons live in Gujarat.
12. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 212.
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Central to the World Bank's credit and loan agreements with India
and the three affected states is the objective requiring that all displaced
persons be empowered, as a result of resettlement and rehabilitation
measures taken on their behalf, to "improve or at least regain the stan-
dard of living they were enjoying prior to their displacement"'3 [empha-
sis added]. The result of classifying encroachers as landless oustees
means that people who are in fact cultivating land they regard as their
own will become landless laborers. This treatment of encroachers does
not meet the norms for resettlement and rehabilitation defined in the
ILO standard or the standard required by World Bank policy and the
credit and loan agreements. The World Bank, however, did not require
compliance with its policy or agreements. Instead, the World Bank fol-
lowed what it called an "incremental" policy, never insisting on compli-
ance with conditions laid down in the credit and loan agreements until it
was too late to secure such compliance.
With respect to the canal, the World Bank failed even to obtain a
covenant in its agreement with Gujarat to require compliance with
World Bank policy. Construction of the canal and irrigation system will
affect as many as 140,000 families, of whom perhaps 13,000 will lose
most or all of their land. Although the numbers of people who will lose
land is an estimate, those who do lose land to the canal and irrigation
system are offered compensation under the Land Acquisition Act of
1894."4 The acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, though,
has often meant that farmers who lose their land are compensated at
rates substantially lower than replacement costs. Thus, villagers living in
the path of the canal have not been provided with resettlement benefits
as World Bank policy has required.
In the case of the Sardar Sarovar, India and the three affected states
bound themselves to meet stricter standards for resettlement and rehabili-
tation than any the governments had agreed to in the past. India had
ratified Convention 107 in 1958. Furthermore, India and the three states
signed the 1985 credit and loan agreements with the World Bank that
contain explicit standards for resettlement and rehabilitation. Despite
formal agreement to comply with these standards, though, India did not
comply with the norms 5. In some cases, involuntary resettlement result-
13. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting terms from the World
Bank's 1985 Development Credit Agreement with the Government of India).
14. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 31.
15. See INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the award of the
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, 1979, binding on India and the states of Gujarat,
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ing from the Sardar Sarovar offended recognized norms of human rights.
This result is ironic, given that both India and the World Bank have
been in the forefront of efforts to secure human rights.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In 1972, after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, a new consciousness of environmental issues emerged. In India, as
elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s, this new consciousness was reflected
in new environmental laws, guidelines, and practices. India lacked a
national policy in the field of resettlement and rehabilitation primarily
because the field is regarded as a state responsibility. In the environ-
mental field, however, the Government of India has developed a com-
prehensive structure of policies for environmental protection and assess-
ment of environmental impact.
Despite this structure of policies, the history of the environmental
aspects of the Sardar Sarovar is a history of non-compliance. Not until
1987 did India's Ministry of Environment and Forests give a conditional
environmental clearance for the dam and canal project. The clearance
provided that instead of completing environmental impact studies before
approval of the Sardar Sarovar, the studies would be done pati passit,
that is, concurrently with construction. This approach undermines the
very basis for environmental planning. Although the conditional environ-
mental clearance did contain a schedule for the completion of the envi-
ronmental impact studies by 1989, most of the studies were not com-
pleted by that year, many have still not been completed.
Without proper data and studies, proper assessments of environmental
impact could not be made and effective ameliorative measures could not
be developed. Therefore, the Independent Review was limited in its
conclusions, although several environmental issues were analyzed. First,
significant discrepancies in the hydrological data and analyses indicated
that the Sardar Sarovar will not perform as planned: no realistic opera-
tional analysis of the project upon which to base an impact assessment
had been done. The backwater effect of sedimentation upstream of the
dam had been neglected by the officials. The Independent Review found
that the backwater effect could mean a rapid, continuing, and cumulative
rise in water level in the river above the reservoir, which could cause
flooding to extensive areas of densely populated farmland. The human
and environmental impacts of such an event could well be severe.
Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh).
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Second, the Independent Review found that no assessment of down-
stream impact had been done. The implications of the Sardar Sarovar
for the geomorphology of the lower reaches of the river and its estuary,
and for the fishery and the people living in the region were unknown.
Available information indicates that the impacts will be serious. The
Hilsa fishery, for example, the largest on the west coast and on which
thousands of people depend, will suffer severe losses or be eliminated
completely. The current measures proposed to mitigate the problem are
inadequate.
Third, the Independent Review found defects in the command area.
Although comprehensive information was unavailable, the Independent
Review concluded that there are likely to be serious problems with
waterlogging and salinity. Assumptions used in design of the canal and
irrigation network, and on the development of mitigative measures, are
questionable. When taken together, the problems that will arise in the
command area will be quite similar to those identified by the World
Bank in many other irrigation projects in its 1991 India Irrigation Sector
Review. 6
As indicated earlier, the World Bank followed what it described as an
incremental strategy in an attempt to secure compliance with its resettle-
ment policies. India did much the same in its adoption of the pari passu
principle with regard to environmental issues. The Independent Review
found, however, that these approaches had failed to achieve their objec-
tives. Moreover, in the Sardor Sarovar Projects, these approaches signi-
fied that these crucial matters, resettlement and environment, are of only
secondary importance to the Government of India.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Independent Review was well aware of the scale of the develop-
ment task facing India, of the importance India places on irrigation in
increasing production in the agricultural sector, and of the long-standing
partnership between India and the World Bank in this endeavor. Because
the Terms of Reference were specific, however, the Independent Review
was required to consider the World Bank's policies, India's environmen-
tal regime, and the credit and loan agreements, and to make critical
assessments of them.
Decisions as to the future of the Sardar Sarovar and the World
Bank's participation in the venture are within the exclusive domain of
16. INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at xxii.
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India and the World Bank. Successful implementation of the enterprise,
however, requires measures that go directly to resolving problems faced
thus far, including the uncertainties of hydrology, the upstream impact,
the command area issues, the downstream impact, human and ecological
well-being, as well as the deficiencies in resettlement policy and imple-
mentation in each of the three states affected. None of these issues can
be ignored.
The Independent Review concluded that the necessary studies must be
done and that the data must be made available for informed decision-
making before further construction takes place. Little can be achieved
while construction continues. The World Bank should take a step back
so that the possibility of making sound decisions will not be further
compromised.
A step back would afford an opportunity to design the kinds of hu-
man and environmental impact assessments that are still needed. A step
back would permit the assessment of data in order to consider what
modifications of the dam and canal project might be necessary.
The human and environmental consequences of the Sardar Sarovar
have not been properly studied. The engineering, design, and operation
of the plan would also profit from further analysis. Any reconsideration
of the venture should include an acknowledgement of the failure of the
World Bank's strategy of incrementalism. It is premature, however, to
compile a series of recommendations on implementation when the flaws
in the plan are obvious.
The Terms of Reference provided that the Independent Review's
assessment should include, as appropriate, recommendations for improve-
ment of implementation. The absence of proper impact assessments and
the paucity of undisputed data, however, limited the Independent
Review's ability to make project-specific recommendations of the kind
contemplated by the Terms of Reference. These recommendations, there-
fore, are limited to the Kevadia Villagers (the first displaced persons),
the canal oustees, downstream policy, and the protection of public
health. These recommendations should be carried through regardless of
the fate of the projects.'
17. INDEPENDENT REviEw, supra note 1, at 349-52. Specific recommendations
were as follows: 1) The people of the six villages affected by construction and devel-
opment of Kevadia Colony were not appropriately and adequately compensated. Id. at
350. The World Bank failed to ensure that such compensation as required by the
1985 agreements. Id The World Bank should require India to provide land for the
families of the six villages, with an adjustment for cash compensation received in the
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The Sardar Sarovar is beset by profound difficulties. These difficulties
have their genesis in the earliest phase of the World Bank's involvement
in the venture, as they turn on the absence of an adequate data base and
failure to consult with the people whose lives and environment were and
continue to be affected. People living in the villages and depending on
the resources of the Narmada Valley should have played a central part
in determining the project's impact. Both their knowledge and their
vulnerabilities are integral to any understanding of what is at issue.
Failure to consult has fueled intense opposition to the project, which has
itself become a serious obstacle to design and implementation of miti-
gative measures. Several factors, including absence of adequate data,
failure of consultation, and hostility towards the dam and canal plan in
the Narmada Valley, had a bearing on every aspect of implementation.
As the Terms of Reference requested recommendations for measures to
improve implementation, the Independent Review stated that the essential
condition was that these underlying difficulties be addressed.
Whatever decisions the World Bank makes about its role in the
Sardar Sarovar, it must bear in mind the critical importance of consulta-
tion with the people of the Narmada Valley and along the route of the
canal. Such consultation would be in accord with the Brundtland Com-
mission, which said that tribal people must be given a decisive voice
regarding resource policy in their lands. Indeed, non-tribal groups must
be given the same opportunity to participate in policy formulation."
Perfect justice cannot be expected in an imperfect world. There is no
doubt that in the national interest, people can be required to give up
their homes and to resettle. India, however, in conformity with the de-
velopment of international standards of human rights, has subscribed to
interim were appropriate. Id. 2) The World Bank should use its authority to ensure
that Gujarat provides resettlement benefits to persons affected by the canal, especially
those farmers who are rendered marginal or landless. Id. 3) The existing threat from
malaria within the command area is serious. Id. at 353. The plan was designed and
executed without appropriate safeguards. Id. The failure to adopt measures to reduce
the likelihood of the spread of malaria illustrates the breakdown between assurances
offered by the World Bank and India and the reality on the ground. Id. The World
Bank should use its authority to ensure that preventive measures are taken as a mat-
ter of urgency to address the public health problems posed by water-borne diseases in
the dam and canal area. Ia
18. See INDEPENDENT REVIEW, supra note 1, at 211 (quoting Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi's statement to the United Nations on the adoption by the General As-
sembly of the Brundtland Commission, "The search for the right answers must go on




certain minimum conditions that must be observed, even when the na-
tional interest is involved. The international standards reflect the inalien-
able human rights of the displaced persons.
The Independent Review did not insist upon an unattainable standard
in environmental impact assessment and mitigation. To construct the
Sardar Sarovar, India has availed itself of world-class engineering tech-
nology. The country should not settle for less than adequate standards in
the application of social and environmental science. The eleventh princi-
ple of the Rio Declaration presented to the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development states that standards of some
countries may be inappropriate, imposing unjustified economic and so-
cial burdens on other countries, particularly developing countries. The
environmental standards for the Sardar Sarovar, however, were estab-
lished by India itself. On the resettlement side, standards were deter-
mined by international covenants to which India had subscribed and by
the credit and loan agreements signed by India and the three states.
CONCLUSION
The Independent Review felt obliged to illuminate the apparent flaws
in the Sardar Sarovar Projects. These problems are not only found in
India, though, or confined to the Sardar Sarovar. The fragile assump-
tions which have supported this project can be found elsewhere. Failure
to consider the human rights of displaced persons and failure to consider
environmental impacts occur in the development of large-scale projects
in both developed and developing countries.
Experience worldwide, in developed as well as developing countries,
has shown that by factoring in and allowing for human and environmen-
tal considerations at the outset, projects can be substantially improved.
To be effective, resettlement and environmental planning must be inte-
grated into the design of projects; otherwise, these issues often pose
costly and burdensome problems at a later stage.
If the human rights obligations identified by the International Labour
Organisation's Convention 107 and in World Bank policy are acknowl-
edged and respected; if the commitment to the environment is real; and
if these are properly integrated into project design at the outset; more
effective and equitable development will ensue. Some believe that these
requirements make it more difficult, often more costly, to build large-
scale projects like Sardar Sarovar. This belief implies that human and
environmental costs are to be heavily discounted in project planning and
execution. Hard lessons from the past show that this is an unacceptable
belief. In some cases alternatives to projects that cause compulsory relo-
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cation on a large scale or severe environmental impact may have to be
sought.
The Independent Review found it impossible to separate its assess-
ment of resettlement and rehabilitation and environmental protection
from a consideration of the Sardar Sarovar Projects as a whole. The
issues of human and environmental impact bear on virtually every aspect
of large-scale development projects. Unless a project can be carried out
in accordance with existing norms of human rights and environmental
protection, norms espoused and endorsed by both the World Bank and
many borrower countries, the project ought not to proceed.
The World Bank must ensure that the principles giving priority to
resettlement and environmental protection are faithfully observed in
projects it chooses to support. This commitment is the only basis for
achievement of the goal now shared by all: truly sustainable develop-
ment.
